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Abstract—When using Online Social Networks, users often
share information with different social groups. When considering
the backgrounds of the groups there is often no or little
intersection within the members. This means that a user who
shares information often has to share it with all members of all
groups. It can be problematic that the user cannot decide which
group sees which information. Our approach therefore, allows
users to decide for every bit of information who can access it.
Further, protected circles can be created, where users can share
information within. Shared information and circles are encrypted
and the keys can be distributed by proxies.
Index Terms—End-to-End Encryption, Online Social Network,
Proxy Encryption, Quorum, Secret Sharing
I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) experience strong popu-
larity and the number of people with at least one social
media account is increasing steadily. Users of OSNs provide
information about themselves and about things they like and
dislike. As this information is arranged by the user itself it
paints a specific image about the user. This is certainly in
the interest of the user if he is among his own group, but it
may be disadvantageous or even inappropriate if the user is
part of different groups. E.g. if the user shares information
with friends about some shared hobby, while colleagues of
the user also participate on the same platform and can see
this information. Therefore, being able to define fine-grained
policies for all shared information on who can access it and
protecting this information from being accessed by other users
is an important target, which we address with our scheme.
Our Contribution
Our contribution is an Online Social Network where in-
formation can be made publicly available or protected by
encryption. For each protected information the access group
can be defined from scratch, such that different users can have
the right to access them. Further, social groups can form circles
where information is, again, encrypted and thus protected.
Keys can be shared with groups of proxies. They can, on
the one hand, forward the decryption keys, according to the
The authors acknowledge the financial support by the Federal Ministry of
Education and Research of Germany in the framework of SoNaTe (project
number 16SV7405).
definitions of the user. On the other hand, they can protect
keys together: comparable to secret sharing schemes either all
proxies have to provide their part or a predefined portion of
them, which has to be approximately met. Additionally, the
encryption parameters are different for all users and can be
changed, which allows voiding previously granted access.
Organization of the Paper
The paper is structured as follows: In Section II related
work, regarding encrypted and privacy preserving Online
Social Networks are discussed. In Section III the fundamental
cryptographic methods for our work are explained and our
proposed system is described in detail. Finally, Section IV
concludes the work and gives an outlook on possible exten-
sions.
II. RELATED WORK
Safebook [1] is a decentralized OSN. Social networks, that
are present in real life are used to construct trust relationships.
The internet is used as the communication and transport
layer. A peer-to-peer layer is used to implement application
services, such as lookup. The third layer is the social network
layer, which is centered on the user. Users are arranged and
connected, such that they form concentric structures to provide
data storage and communication privacy. These structures
protect the centered nodes because connections from outer
rings follow trust relations from real life. The nodes on the
rings provide profile retrieval and communication obfuscation.
Persona [2] is another privacy-preserving OSN. Users define
who can access their information. Attribute-based encryption
is used, such that users can define fine-grained access
policies. Further, attribute-based encryption allows sharing
ciphertext within groups of participants that share at least one
attribute. Additionally, each user has a key-pair for encryption
of symmetric keys. The public key is distributed to other
users to encrypt data in groups of multiple users. This is an
additional method to the attribute-based encryption.
Another OSN, utilizing end-to-end encryption is Snake [3].
The OSN is a client-side application, written in HTML5
and JavaScript. The encryption procedures of Snake use the
WebCrypto API and are performed only on the client-side.
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This allows the server to be used as a CRUD interface
for ciphertexts, without additional functionality. The design
of the database does not allow concluding which users
communicate, because addresses are masked.
LotusNet [4] is a framework that allows using the peer-to-peer
paradigm with strong user authentication in OSNs. A flexible
and fine-grained access control system balances security,
privacy, and services in OSNs. Distributed hash tables are
used as the underlying storage. Overlay nodes provide strong
authentication and enable communication with a service layer.
Content is stored as encrypted ciphertexts in the DHT layer.
Ciphertexts are tagged with arbitrary labels from the users.
The search engine finds appropriate data using these labels.
In [5] neighborhood attacks are analyzed. It is stated, that
attackers with knowledge about neighbors of a victim can
re-identify them in the OSN. In the first step of the proposed
solution, the neighborhoods of all vertices are extracted. In
the second step, they are grouped. Neighborhoods in the
same groups are anonymized by generalizing vertex labels
and inserting additional edges.
In [6] a comparable attack, called friendship attack is
described. Here, an adversary uses the degree of two vertices
connected by an edge to re-identify victims. k2-degree
anonymity is introduced to limit the probability of re-
identifying victims. k2-degree anonymity means, that for
every edge where the connected nodes have degree d1 and
d2 at least k − 1 other vertices with the same degrees d1, d2
exist. This is achieved by introducing additional edges into
the graph.
An access control model for OSNs is presented in [7]. The
model formalizes and generalizes the privacy preservation
mechanism of Facebook. The model can be instantiated
to express policies which are currently not supported by
Facebook and gives a formal framework for the analysis of
such policies in other OSNs.
In [8] decentralization is used to construct a privacy-
preserving OSN. Centralization is seen as the key privacy
issue because a potentially malicious service provider is in
control of all data. The OSN leverages trust relationships of
social networking. A proposed anonymization technique uses
multi-hop routing between trusted nodes to provide privacy
and data access and exchange.
A paradigm to allow users to choose so-called suites of
privacy settings is presented in [9]. The suites can be
specified by friends of the users or trusted experts and
modified. They allow implementing expressive and usable
privacy controls. This is considered a major challenge, as
a wrong understanding of privacy settings could lead to
unwanted disclosure of information in an OSN.
In [10] a privacy-by-proxy design for APIs in OSNs is
proposed. Often, third-party content is integrated into sites in
OSNs. Therefore, third-party developers may get access to
user data, which introduces privacy risks. In the work, popular
Facebook applications are analyzed and a privacy-preserving
API is proposed. It provides anonymized social graphs and
placeholders for user data.
FlyByNight [11] is an extension to Facebook. It uses client-
side JavaScript to encrypt content, such that plaintext data
is not sent to Facebook. The keys are managed through the
existing infrastructure. An additional password is used to
encrypt a private key. This key is stored as a ciphertext on
a flyByNight server. The application allows encrypting data
for multiple participants. This is achieved by using the public
keys of participants to encrypt the data. Public information
is encrypted using proxy-cryptography: unique keys are used
to encrypt the data. The ciphertexts are modified for every
user by the server, such that decryption is possible with their
private keys.
None of Your Business (NOYB) [12] is another extension
for Facebook. Here, information is masked. To mask data,
like public posts or personal information, it is split into
small parts, called atoms. Then, atoms are replaced by other
atoms, according to different public dictionaries of atoms
from participants and non-participants. The dictionary lookup
procedure uses the index of an atom, which then is encrypted
with a symmetric key and a random nonce. This ciphertext
is used as a new index to find a masking atom. Different
dictionaries are used, such that meaningful atoms are used for
masking. E.g. the location of a user is masked with another
users location.
III. PROPOSED ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK
For the encryption of small content the asymmetric scheme
of Elgamal [13] is used. A message m is encrypted for a
recipient B by the sender A as follows: The sender A chooses
a number r uniformly random between 0 and p−1, where p is
a large prime and p− 1 has at least one large prime factor. A
computes c0 ≡ gr mod p and c1 ≡ m · gxBr mod p, where
g is a public value, known to both A and B. gxB mod p
is the public key of B. The tuple (c0, c1) is the ciphertext. B
calculates gxBr ≡ (c0)xB mod p, where xB is the private key
of B. By computing c1/gxBr ≡ m · gxBr/gxBr ≡ m mod p
the message is decrypted.
The scheme allows to encrypt a message for multiple recipi-
ents B,C, . . . with public keys xB , xC , . . . . The ciphertext
(c′0, c
′
1) ≡ (gr,m · gr(xB+xC+... ) mod p can be decrypted,
when all recipients compute d ≡ (c′0)(xB+xC+... ) mod p to-
gether. The message is computed, again by dividing c′1 by
d: m ≡ c′1/d mod p. The random parameter of a ci-
phertext (c0, c1) ≡ (gr, gXr ·m) mod p can be modified by
anybody with knowledge of the public key gX . No knowl-
edge of the current random parameter r, message m, or
private key x is needed. By computing c′0 ≡ c0 · gq mod p
and c′1 ≡ c1 · (gX)q mod p the ciphertext is modified to
(c′0, c
′
1) ≡ (gr+q,m · gX(r+q)) mod p. The encrypted mes-
sage m stays the same. These two properties are utilized by
our approach.
A. Overview
In the proposed OSN each user can share public and private
information with other users. This, for example can be the
name of the user, the employment status, the phone number,
or posts. A user can decide which information is public and
which information is private. E.g. it is possible, that a post
about the current political situation is marked private by the
user, whereas another post about the weather may be marked
as public. Private information is encrypted, and therefore can
only be accessed by specific users. The user can decide which
group of users can decrypt the information by sharing the
key with them, or a group of proxies. The proxies can relay
the key when the user is not available. Users can join circles.
Circles are groups of users that share information with all other
members of the circle. Circles and private information are
encrypted to ensure privacy. Most likely, private information
is small in size, then it is encrypted using the asymmetric
scheme of Elgamal. For different parts of information different
keys are generated. When private information is too large,
it is encrypted using a faster symmetric scheme. Then, the
corresponding key is encrypted using the scheme of Elgamal.
Information in circles, always is encrypted using a common
symmetric key. This key is shared, again as a ciphertext,
created with the scheme of Elgamal. This key is can be
distributed by proxies. Each proxy receives at least one share
of the key. A user, that is new to the circle has to receive every
share of the key from the proxies. The model is depicted in
Figure 1.
B. Encryption and Decryption of Content
Content is distinguished into two types: public content and
protected content. The user can decide, which of his content is
public or protected. Public content can be accessed by all users
of the OSN. Protected content is either private information
or circle content. Private information is content, which is
shared by a user with specific groups of users, e.g. specific
friends. Parts of private information, often, are short and
therefore are encrypted, using the Elgamal encryption scheme.
No noteworthy differences in the run-times, when compared to
symmetric encryption algorithms should be noticeable. Larger
content, such as circle content, on the other hand, is encrypted,
using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The necessary keys
are short and therefore encrypted using the Elgamal encryption
scheme. All protected content, which is encrypted, using the
Elgamal scheme can be shared through a proxy system. This
content in the following is denoted as short content.
Short content m can be encrypted using multiple public proxy-
keys ga, gb, . . . of users a, b, . . . and a randomly chosen
encryption parameter r. By computing
c ≡ m · (ga)r · (gb)r · . . .
≡ m · gr(a+b+... ) mod p (1)
content is encrypted. c and gr are sent to the server. This
allows the server to distributed short content. When a user
wants to access content c, the server re-encrypts it. For
the re-encryption procedure the server generates two random
numbers s and t. Then, c is modified for u by calculating
cu ≡ c · t
≡ m · gr(a+b+... ) · t mod p. (2)
Further, using the public keys ga, gb, . . . of the according users
a, b, . . . the value pu is calculated as
pu ≡ t · (ga)s · (gb)s · . . .
≡ t · gs(a+b+... ) mod p. (3)
The server sends cu, pu, gs, and gr to u. To decrypt the short
content u has to send gr and gs to all users a, b, . . . . They
then can compute the decryption values (gr)−a, (gr)−b, . . .
and (gs)−a, (gs)−b, . . . . Then, u can compute m · t as:
m · t ≡ cu · g−ar · g−br · . . .
≡ m · t · gr(a+b+... ) · g−r(a+b+... ) mod p (4)
and t as:
t ≡ pu · g−as · g−bs · . . .
≡ t · gs(a+b+... ) · g−s(a+b+... ) mod p. (5)
To decrypt m the user has to compute m·tt mod p. It is
possible to encrypt short content with a single proxy-key. The
calculations stay similar, but only one shareholder s has to
calculate the decryption values for cu and pu.
The benefit of the additional factors s and t is, that the server
can delete them, when the proxies request it. When u wants to
receive cu again from the server it is a new value and cannot
be decrypted with the values u received the previous time.
This allows revoking the access to resources.
C. Distribution of Proxy-Keys
Proxy-keys are used to distribute short content. Short con-
tent can be decrypted, only if all contributors participate. In
the simple case, a proxy-key pa is just the public key of user
A. As public keys are stored on the server, everybody can
use them for the distribution of data. Only user A knows the
corresponding private key a and can compute g−a, which is
needed for the decryption.
In the other case, a proxy-key gx is generated by choosing x
at random. gx, then, is encrypted for users A,B, . . . . This
is achieved by choosing random parameters ra, rb, . . . and
calculating tuples (gra , gara · x), (grb , gbrb · x), . . . , where
ga, gb, . . . are the public keys of users A,B, . . . . This allows
distributing the same proxy-key to multiple users. This is used
for the distribution of private information and circle content.
A user specifies for each private information the group of
users, which is allowed to decrypt the information. For ex-
ample, the user u may share some information i, like his date
of birth and phone number, with all friends f ∈ F , whereas
u wants to share other information j, like his residence, with
all friends and their friends G. The user, then, can encrypt i
using a key x. Content j is encrypted using the key y. The
key y can be shared with all f ∈ F . If another user g ∈ G
wants to decrypt such content, every f can help him decrypt
it. The other key x can be shared with all users f , such they
can decrypt it. But, there is no need for u to share x or y
with all f ∈ F , but with some f ′ ∈ F ′ ⊂ F , such that users
f∗ ∈ F \ F ′ can receive them from any user f ′.
The keys for circle content can be shared with a quorum Q of
user User
Public Information
NameResidence . . .
Post about the weather
Circles
¤c0 ¤c1 . . .
Content . . .
Private Information
¤pi0 ¤pi1 . . .
Post about
the political
situation Date of Birth Phone Number
. . .
Fig. 1. A user can share private and public information. For every information the user can define who is allowed to access it. Further, circles can be joined.
In circles, users can share information with all members of the same circle. Circles and private information are secured by encryption.
participants in the circle. Then, for example, three proxy-keys
a, b, and c are generated and used to encrypt the content, as
described in Equation 1. The keys, then, are distributed to Q,
such that each member q ∈ Q receives one key. This allows
users to decrypt the content if three members with mutually
different keys help in the decryption procedure.
Members of the quorum can receive multiple keys, such that
different probabilistic thresholds can be achieved. One way of
distributing these keys to the members is to hand a key to every
member, such that they are equally distributed. Every follow-
ing key for the members then is randomly chosen from all keys
which are not already distributed to the member. When apply-
ing this scheme to a quorum of size 10, with 6 different keys
k ∈ (0, 1, . . . , 5) and two keys per member m ∈ (0, 1, . . . , 9),
a member m receives the keys i = m mod 6 and j 6= i.
Simulations show, that a probabilistic threshold of 5 can be
achieved using this distribution: on average one has to pick
5.5 members to receive all keys and the probability that 4, 5,
or 6 picks are needed is about 0.75.
IV. CONCLUSION
We introduced a scheme for a partially encrypted Online So-
cial Network. Users can define, which information is protected
through encryption, and who can decrypt it. Information can be
shared with different groups of users. Further, circles of users
can be created where the content is encrypted, too. The keys
can be distributed by a proxy system. This allows the sharing
of keys, even if the user is not available. Another benefit of
proxies is, that each proxy can receive one or more different
portions of a key. This allows granting access in different
scenarios: all proxies are needed or an approximate threshold
of collaborating proxies is defined. The keys are modified by
the server for each user. The parameters of this modification
can be deleted, which allows the voiding of access.
Further improvements to the scheme can be made by applying
a real secret sharing scheme for the portions of the keys.
This allows for creating definite threshold values. Additional
modifications could move the modification of the keys from
the server to the proxies. This reduces the ability of the server
to mischievously erase encryption parameters for users.
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